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COMMENTS
CONSENT TO SUMIARY JURISDICTION
One of the most enigmatic features of bankruptcy jurisdiction is the operation
of consent as a basis for the exercise of summary jurisdiction to grant affirmative
relief to a trustee. For the bankruptcy practitioner, the operation of the con-
sensual theory has often been a trying and costly experience.'
I. NATUrE OF SU=IARY JTJISDICTIO-IN GExERA
It is sometimes said that "all of the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court acting
strictly in character is summary," 2 when compared with the general legal and
equitable, or, as it is commonly known, plenary jurisdiction of the district
court.3 Thus, the court in Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwdl4
suggested:
[Bankruptcy jurisdiction] ... is based upon petition. and proceeds without formal
pleadings; [plenary jurisdiction] . . . proceeds upon formal pleadings. In the former,
the necessary parties are cited in by order to show cause; in the latter, formal
summons brings in the parties other than the plaintiff. In the former, short time
notice of hearing is fixed by the court; in the latter, time for pleading and hearing
is fixed by statute or by rule of court. In the former, the hearing is quite generally
upon affidavits; in the latter, examination of witnesses is the usual method. In the
former, the hearing is sometimes ex parte; in the latter, a full hearing is had,
It should also be noted that there is no jury trial in a summary proceeding.
1. See Feihelman, What Is the Difference Between Summary and Plenary Jurisdiction
in Bankruptcy?, 39 Fla. BJ. 155 (1965); Ferguson, The Consensual Basis of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction in Matters of Bankruptcy: Fact and Fiction, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 491, 492 (1910).
The consensual aspect of summary jurisdiction was little becet with conflict thirty year. ago.
See Glenn, Liquidation §§ 463-64 (1935). However, conflict and divergent opinion have b.en
the order of the day in recent years. See MacLadan, Bankruptcy § 196 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as MIacLachlan].
2. Macachlan § 194, at 206. The district court's bankruptcy jurisdiction is statutory. In
the Matter of Ross Sand & Gravel, Inc., 2S9 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam).
Consequently, "the courts of bankruptcy .. . are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power
to act must he found expressly or impliedy in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act ... :'
O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 455 (10th Cir. 1964). (Citations omitted.) See gener-
ally 1 Collier, Bankruptcy Uf 2.04 (14th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Collier]; 1 Remington,
Bankruptcy § 35 (5th ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as Remington]. The Bankruptcy Act
makes specific grants of summary jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court in several situations.
E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 571, 67a(4), 52 Stat. S67, 876 (1933), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(1), 107(a) (4)
(1964).
3. The district court's bankruptcy jurisdiction must he distinguished from its general
jurisdiction. See Associated Electronic Supply Co. v. C.B.S. Electronic Sales Corp., 2,3 F2d
6S3, 634 (8th Cir. 1961); Hanna v. Brictson Afg. Co., 62 F.2d 139, 145 (3th Cir. 132).
4. 58 F.2d 721 (Sth Cir. 1932).
5. Id. at 731-32.
6. See Hunt, Summary Proceedings in Bankruptcy, 22 Ref. J. 109, 111 (1943). The right
to a jury trial in this context has been viewed as crucial to the distinction hetween theze tvwo
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
However, despite the informality and the celerity of the proceedings in the bank-
ruptcy court,7 the guaranties of due process must be met.8 For this reason,
summary jurisdiction must be predicated upon the bankruptcy court's possession,
actual or constructive, of the property in question,9 or a merely colorable claim
proffered by the party having possession.10 If, however, a claim is truly adverse,
the trustee must seek his remedy in a plenary suit,1 unless there is consent by
the adverse party to the disposition of his rights by summary proceedings.
12
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSENSUAL THEORY
A. In General
It is in trying to accommodate the elements of due process with the prerogatives
of the bankruptcy courts, which "are courts of equity and exercise all equitable
powers unless prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act," 13 that bankruptcy law has
sometimes fostered confusion and discouragement.
methods by at least one writer: "To the extent ... that an adverse party may escape
summary disposition of his claim or defense and establish a right to jury trial, the difference
between a summary and plenary proceeding remains of considerable importance." Ferguson,
supra note 1, at 493. (Emphasis omitted.)
7. See MacLachlan § 193, at 204.
8. See In re Harry L. Sugarman, Inc., 3 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1924) (per curlam); In re
Frank, 182 Fed. 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1910). "[T]here is no denial of due process of law in a
summary proceeding and the parties have all of the traditional safeguards of a plenary suit,
except the right of jury trial." Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36
Ref. J. 73, 74 (1962). (Footnote omitted.) See generally Hunt, Summary Proceedings in
Bankruptcy, 22 Ref. J. 109 (1948).
9. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (19,10); see 2 Collier g1 23.05
[1], at 468-69 & n.7. See generally 2 id. f1 23.05; Note, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1940).
10. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 194 (1926); Cherno v. Engine Air Serv., Inc.,
330 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1964); In the Matter of Plymouth Dyeing Co., 323 F.2d 134,
138-39 (3d Cir. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 998 (1964).
11. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115 (1925); Nicklaus v. Bank of Russellville, 336
F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir. 1964). See generally 5 Remington §§ 2134-35. It should be noted,
however, that the bankruptcy court "has jurisdiction to inquire into the claim . . . ." May
v. Henderson, supra at 116. Where an adverse claim is alleged, "a preliminary inquiry Is
necessary and appropriate to ascertain whether the case is one for a summary proceeding or
a plenary suit." American Mannex Corp. v. Huffstutler, 329 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1964).
12. Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 164 (1938); MacDonald v. Plymouth
County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263, 265 (1932); Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d
382, 386 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 810 (1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S.
944 (1956).
13. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 (1945). This point is so well established as to
be considered elementary. Carrier Corp. v. J. E. Schecter Corp., 347 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965). The various equitable maxims have often been applied in
the courts of bankruptcy. E.g., Central States Corp. v. Luther, 215 F.2d 38, 46 (10th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955) (he who seeks equity must do equity); Litzke v.
Gregory, 1 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1924) ("clean hands" doctrine). However, the applic-
ability of equitable principles is limited to situations where such principles are not Incon-
sistent with the Bankruptcy Act. Young v. Higbee Co., supra at 214. See generally I Collier
II 2.09; 1 Remington § 22.
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Reduced to simplest terms, an adverse claimant's consent to summary pro-
ceedings may be either express or implied.14 The former, evidenced by a
stipulation executed by the adverse claimant,' s and a hybrid of the two, charac-
terized by a voluntary turnover of the property to the bankruptcy court or its
officers,' 0 have caused little difficulty to the practitioner or to the courts. On
the other hand, consent implied from the voluntary assertion of a claim by an
adverse claimant against specific property in the hands of the trustee'- or of
a claim against the bankrupt estate' s has had a peculiarly erratic history.
Prior to the 1935 case of Alexander v. Hilmn1 the bankruptcy courts were
definitely adverse to granting any relief to a trustee other than by way of ex-
punging or diminishing a creditor's claim.20 Since that decision, "an increasing
body of case law which is slowly eroding judicial reluctance to expand the
summary jurisdiction of referees"' ' has developed. The persuasiveness of
the consensual theory has encouraged this expansion. 2
B. The Old View
1. Proof of Claim
The pre-Alexander view as to the effect of filing a proof of claim was set out
in Fitch v. Richardson.2 3 The trustee there had answered the creditor's proof of
claim with an allegation that the creditor held collateral for the debt. In fact,
the alleged security exceeded the claim by 1,339 dollars, and the district court
ordered the surplus returned to the trustee. The appellate court held that the
14. Another spedes of consent is that manifested by the adverse claimant's failure to
enter "timely" objection to summary jurisdiction. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 66 Stat. 420
(1952), 11 U.S.C. § I1(a)(7) (1964). This form was codified in order to revere the holding
of Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944) (turnover proceeding by trustee), that an advere
claimant could object to the exercise of summary jurisdiction at any time before final order.
See H.R. Rep. No. 2320, S2d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952). A detailed discusaion of the probkcm of
the Cline decision is found in 2 Collier 23.0S[4]. The "timely objection" clause of § 2a(7)
has no application where the adverse claimant has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim or reclamation petition. Inter-State Nat'1
Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 3M2, 3SS (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 US. 944 (1955), ccrt dis-
missed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
15. See 2 Collier 23.09[3].
16. See 2 id. , 23.03[21, at 535.
17. This is more commonly known as a petition for reclamation. See generally 4 id.
70,9; 5A Remington §§ 2476-79.
13. Bankruptcy Act § 57, 52 Stat. 866 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1964).
19. 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
20. See, e.g., Spears v. Frenchton & B.R.R., 213 Fed. 7S4 (4th Cir. 1914); In re Haley, iSS
Fed. 74 (64th Cir.), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 546 (1903); Fitch v. Richardson, 147 Fed. 197
(1st Cir. 10,06).
21. Seidman, Summary jurisdiction of the Referee: Some Recent Developments, 39 Ref.
J. 100 (1965).
22. See Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 99 F. Supp. S99 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 196 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 917 (1953); In re Nathan, 93 F. Supp. 6S56 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
23. 147 Fed. 197 (1st Cir. 1906).
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bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to grant an affirmative decree
against an adverse claimant who had merely filed a proof of claim, despite the
fact that the claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction.'2
Fitch merely illustrates the then prevailing opinion that jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts "goes no further than to permit of an inquiry into and
determination of, the net amount due the creditor.1 2 When a counterclaim by
the trustee was clearly in excess of the claim presented by the creditor, the
bankruptcy court could either (1) stay the proceedings, pending a final ad-
judication of the counterclaim in a proper court,2 0 or, (2) if the trustee waived
his right to recover the excess, proceed upon the merits of the trustee's counter-
claim to determine whether it diminished or expunged the creditor's allowed
claims.27
The philosophy that "the spirit and purpose of the act do not contemplate a
general judgment in favor of the bankrupt estate against a third person" -8 was
indicative of a growing fear that the bankruptcy courts were exceeding their
jurisdictional powers and were usurping the powers of the state courts." Courts
adopting this philosophy convinced one another of the orthodoxy of their position
by relying heavily, albeit unsoundly, on two Supreme Court cases-Bardes v.
Itawarden Bank3" and Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor.3 ' Both cases involved
summary suits in a court of bankruptcy against adverse claimants: Bardes, to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance; and Comingor, to turn over fees paid to a
general assignee before bankruptcy proceedings were commenced. In Bardes,
the Court held that section 2332 was designed so that
independent suits brought by the trustee . . . to assert a title to money or property
as assets of the bankrupt against strangers to those proceedings, should not come
within the jurisdiction of the District Courts . .. "unless by consent of the proposed
defendant," of which there is no pretence in this case. 33
24. Id. at 199. This decision apparently still represents the law in the First Circuit In
regard to counterclaims. In an almost identical case in the Fourth Circuit, the same result was
reached. Morton G. Thalhimer, Inc. v. Florance, 58 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1932).
25. In re Continental Producing Co., 261 Fed. 627, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1919). Accord, Metz v.
Knobel, 21 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1927); In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851 (E.D.N.C. 1910); In re
Harper, 175 Fed. 412 (N.D.N.Y. 1910).
26. In re Continental Producing Co., 261 Fed. 627, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1919). This alternative
has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467,
477-78 (1966).
27. In re Continental Producing Co., 261 Fed. 627, 629-30 (S.D. Cal. 1919).
28. In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 284 Fed. 281, 283 (W.D. Wash. 1922),
aff'd on other grounds, 293 Fed. 192 (9th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 582 (1924).
29. See Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U.S. 521 (1875); In re Bacon, 210 Fed. 129 (2d Cir. 1913).
In Eyster v. Gaff, supra, the Supreme Court vividly expressed its opinion as to any ex-
pansion of the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court: "This court has steadily sot
its face against this view." Id. at 525.
30. 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
31. 184 U.S. 18 (1902).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 23, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 552 (1898) (amended by 52 Stat. 854 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 46 (1964)).
33. 178 U.S. at 538. An important distinction must b.e made as to the operation of § 23
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Comingor, viewed as being squarely "within the ruling in Bardes"34 pointed out
that there was no consent since the defendant was peremptorily brought before
the bankruptcy court on an order to show cause.25 Therefore, relying upon
Bardes and Comingor, and ignoring the essential distinction that by filing a proof
of claim a creditor had voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court, courts consistently found no consent, and hence no jurisdiction, to entertain
a counterclaim for affirmative relief by a trustee?3°
2. Petition for Reclamation
A somewhat different posture was taken by the courts when the adverse
claimant had availed himself of the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy by
filing a petition for reclamation. Even prior to 1935, in Opcrators' Piano Co. v.
First Wis. Trust Co.,3 7 and similar cases,38 it was generally held that, by filing
a petition for reclamation, the adverse claimant consented to summary adjudica-
in regard to summary jurisdiction where the adverse claimant has affirmatively availed him-
self of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to share in the bankrupt estate. Section 23
"applies only when the trustee brings suit .... " Columbia Foundry Co. v. Lochner, 179
F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1950). See Seligson & King, supra note 8, at 79. It in no way limits
the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court, but rather relates to the
plenary jurisdiction of the district court. See AMacLachlan § 197, at 212-13. See generally
2 Collier 1 23.03. Therefore, the consent provision of § 23b applies where the adverse
claimant is brought into a turnover proceeding at the instance of the trustee. The ultimate
source of the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court lies in the broad grant of
power found in Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § lla(7) (194).
The claimant, by voluntarily entering the bankruptcy proceeding, exposes himself to the
jurisdiction of the court to proceed upon counterclaims interposed by the trustee. Wia:wall
v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347 (1S76); Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp., 120 F.2d
33S (8th Cir. 1942).
Specific provision is made for setting off mutual debts in Bankruptcy Act § 65, 52 Stat.
$7S (1938), 11 U.S.C. § lOS (1964). However, this section has no effect upon the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court. Nonetheless, it does suggest, by its silence on the que-ion of
counterclaims (other than to negative the use of certain counterclaims held by debtors of
the bankrupt), that summary jurisdiction is proper as to trustee's counterclaims where the
adverse claimant has voluntarily entered the court. See Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther,
221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 810 (1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation,
350 U.S. 944 (1956). For a complete discussion of § 6S as it relates to jurisdiction, see
4 Collier I 68.20.
34. 184 U.S. at 24.
35. Id. at 26.
36. The typical pre-Alexander view was expounded by Profezor Glenn when he stated
that a creditor who filed a proof of claim had "the absolute right to withdraw it if he
changes his mind. . . . [Ilnasmuch as no counterclaim, as distinct from a defense, can he
interposed to a claim when so offered, it follows that the right of withdrawal remains
absolute." Glenn, Liquidation § 464 (1935). (Footnotes omitted.) See generally id. §§ 463-64.
37. 283 Fed. 904 (7th Cir. 1922).
38. In re Barnett, 12 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 699 (1923); In re
Pennsylvania Coffee Co., S F.2d 98 (WD. Pa. 1925).
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tion of all issues including affirmative counterclaims by the trustee.8 The court
in Operators' Piano reasoned that
a litigant cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of the court and the particular form
of proceeding (summary as well as plenary) and then object to the disposition of
the issues which the respondent (the trustee) may raise either as a defense to his
petition or as the basis of a counterclaim. The consent thus given cannot be sub-
sequently withdrawn.40
The carte blanche thus given bankruptcy courts with respect to trustee's counter-
claims was soon restricted to those closely related to the claim of the adverse
party.
41
C. The Turning Point-The Alexander Case
Although the federal courts had cast a jaundiced eye upon any enlargement of
the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court during the first four decades
of this century, the Supreme Court provided an opinion with which any court
with liberal views in this area could modify the restrictive posture previously
taken.
In 1935, Alexander v. Hillman,42 the case which was later to supply a wedge
by which the courts opened the door to an expanded summary jurisdiction, was
decided. This case involved an equity receivership to wind up the corporate
business and distribute the assets of the corporation. The respondents, who
had been corporate directors and officers, presented their claims. The receivers
not only opposed these claims, but also filed four equitable counterclaims alleging
fraudulent conversion of corporate assets and seeking affirmative relief. In
affirming a money judgment in favor of the receivers, the Court held that, since
the respondents had voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
receivership court (a court of equity), that court could properly grant relief on
the receivers' counterclaims.43 The Supreme Court found it quite reasonable that
"the receivers . . . insist that, before taking aught, respondents may by the
receivership court be required to make restitution. '44 Thus, while ostensibly
reaffirming the equitable principle that "equity delights to do justice and not by
halves, ' 45 the Court was also acknowledging more subtle, but no less compelling,
39. Although it was not explicitly mentioned by the court, the claim of the trustee arose
out of the same transaction as that sued upon by the reclaiming petitioner.
40. 283 Fed. at 906. However, the view was different where the claimant had entered
the bankruptcy court by filing a proof of claim. See note 36 supra.
41. See Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154 (1932).
42. 296 U.S. 222 (1935), 22 Va. L. Rev. 963 (1936).
43. 296 U.S. at 238. The Court found little difficulty in disposing of the question of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and counterclaims. Id. at 237-38.
44. Id. at 241-42.
45. Clark, Equity § 24, at 35 (1954). The Court stated that its decision was in conformity
with this maxim. 296 U.S. at 242. For a complete discussion of this principle that equity,
once having taken jurisdiction, will give complete relief, see 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
§§ 231-42 (5th ed. 1941). There are, however, some limitations on its operation. Id. § 233.
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reasons for sustaining the receivership court's action-convenience of the parties
and speedy disposition of insolvent estates.4 0
D. Development Since Alexander
By 1938, at least one court had applied Alcxandcr to bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 47 Gradually and inevitably, it has become well established not only that a
claimant can impliedly consent to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the
bankruptcy court,4 but also that an affirmative judgment can be entered by that
court in favor of the trustee .4  However, a question still remains as to the
propriety of extending the consensual theory to all of the trustee's counterclaims.
1. Petition of Reclamation
Where the claimant was a reclaiming petitioner, there was no question, even
prior to 1935, as to the court's power to accord the trustee affirmative relief.00
Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co.51 had, however, barred such relief on counterclaims
by the trustee which were not immediately related to the claim presented. 2 The
Court reasoned that to view the filing of a petition for reclamation as consent to
the summary adjudication of a trustee's counterclaim which was not closely
related to the claim proffered "might lead to unfortunate complications and
deprive owners of property of fair opportunity to recover. ' 3 The Court rejected
the argument that public policy and the need for speed in disposition of bank-
ruptcy cases justify the exercise of such jurisdiction. 4 However, having invoked
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, a creditor may not thereafter deny
jurisdiction over related questions while the estate is still being administered.5
46. See 296 U.S. at 242-43.
47. Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1933).
48. See cases cited note 22 supra.
49. Ibid. Contra, Gill v. Phillips, 337 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964); Fitch v. Richardzon, 147
Fed. 197 (Ist Cir. 1906).
50. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
51. 2S5 U.S. 154 (1932).
52. Id. at 162. See generally SA Remington § 2475.
53. 285 U.S. at 162. The necessity of "immediate relation" of the trustee's counterclaim
has been strongly reiterated. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Glavin, IC4 F.2d 851 (3d Cir.),
petition for cert. denied, 3SS U.S. 593 (1939); In re C. A. Goldsmith Co., 122 F. Supp. 19
(D.N.J. 1954).
54. 285 U.S. at 162.
55. Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp., 12S F.2d 33S, 341 (Sth Cir. 1942).
The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to render an affirmative judgment in favor of a trustee
on his counterclaim is limited to situations in which the adverse claimant is a private party.
Where the United States Government is the reclaiming petitioner, the bankruptcy court
lacks jurisdiction not only to grant relief in favor of the trustee, but also to cet off or
recoup against the Government's title to property. In re Greenstreet, Inc., M9 F2d 6C0,
667 (7th Cir. 1954). Where the Government has filed a proof of claim against the bankrupt
estate, it is still unclear whether the trustee's related counterclaim may be used to expunge
or diminish that claim. Compare id. at 663, with In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141
F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
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2. Proof of Claim
One major barrier to the expansion of summary jurisdiction was breached in
Florance v. Kresge.56 There, a creditor filed a proof of claim based upon a rental
agreement, and the receivers (one of whom had been appointed as trustee)
answered with a set off based upon the same agreement, requesting a judgment
for any balance remaining after the creditor's claim was expunged. Relying on
Alexander, the Fourth Circuit upheld the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
to grant an affirmative judgment in favor of the trustee, stating that the bank-
ruptcy court is "a court of equity even though exercising special statutory
powers . . . . ,,57 The Florance court was the first to view the filing of a proof of
claim by an adverse claimant as constituting the requisite consent to the exercise
of summary jurisdiction by the court of bankruptcy.
Other courts did not readily recognize the possibilities of Alexander in a
bankruptcy context.58 In fact, the Fourth Circuit stood alone until 1942 when
a district court in California indicated agreement in In re Mercury Eng'r Co.50
The referee had suspended the proceedings below to allow the trustee to pursue
his remedy in a plenary action. The district judge, although the case was not
before him on proper pleadings, expressed the belief that, since the bankruptcy
court is functionally identifiable with a court of equity, if the need arose, "the
right to award a judgment for the surplus exists."'00
Although the Second Circuit,61 in 1945, bad approved the Alexander reasoning
in a railroad reorganization proceeding under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act,G2 the definitive adoption of the Alexander doctrine in that circuit was
56. 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938).
57. Id. at 786.
58. A subsequent district court case, decided in the same year as Florance, denied the
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief on a trustee's counterclaim for
an alleged voidable preference, and did not mention the Florance decision. In re Florsheim,
24 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Cal. 1938), appeal dismissed per curiam per stipulation sub nom.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Cheek, 110 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1940).
59. 60 F. Supp. 786 (S. D. Cal. 1945), order affirmed after rehearing, 68 F. Supp. 376
(S.D. Cal. 1946).
60. Id. at 787. The court cited the Alexander and Florance decisions, stating in regard to
the former that, "while the court there was dealing with receivers, the principle is the same
in bankruptcy." Id. at 788. Thus, the view of the Alexander decision as to subject matter
jurisdiction was adopted-i.e., the presentation of a claim by the creditor brings the entire
res before the bankruptcy court, including counterclaims. See note 43 supra. The reasoning
in Mercury was that jurisdiction to decide the validity of the claim encompassed not only
invalidating objections, but also the determination of the validity of a counterclaim for any
surplus owing to the bankrupt estate. See 60 F. Supp. at 788.
The court, while noting that the same district court had adhered to the pre-Alexander
view in In re Florsheim, 24 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Cal. 1938), appeal dismissed per curiam per
stipulation sub nom. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Cheek, 110 F.2d 660
(9th Cir. 1940), adopted the post-Alexander view, pointing out that the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had not yet "spoken in the matter." 60 F. Supp. at 788 n.1.
61. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. Bankruptcy Act § 77, added by 47 Stat. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205
(1964).
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delayed another eight years until Conway v. Union Bank of SwitzcrlandPc There,
Judge Learned Hand, strongly influenced by the operation of res judicata in a
subsequent plenary proceeding,04 opined that, if it were ever in doubt whether
the filing of a proof of claim exposed the creditor to an affirmative judgment
against him on a counterclaim by the trustee, the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander settled the question.,
3. The Preference Cases
The so-called "implied consent" cases took on a new look with In re Nathan.CO
In that case, a Delaware corporation filed a proof of claim, and the trustee
objected and counterclaimed for affirmative relief upon certain voidable pref-
erences67 which arose out of the same transaction as the claim. The referee
63. 204 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1953), petition for cert. dismisscd ppr stipulation, 350 U.S.
978 (1956).
64. 204 F.2d at 607. A bankruptcy court's "judgments, decrees and order.3 pomces all the
attributes of finality and estoppel accorded to domestic judgments emanating from courts
of general original jurisdiction." 5 Remington § 2309. (Footnote omitted.) In the case of
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as petitioner's claim, to force the trustee
to resort to a plenary suit for affirmative relief would be inappropriate and wasteful since
"the issues adjudicated as defenses to the claim would be res judicata in the plenary suit."
In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 US. 940 (1953).
It is accurate to say that "res judicata . . . is not an absolute imperative of the law ...
[and] represents a policy which ... must be weighed and balanced when in conflict with com-
peting policies." Ferguson, The Consensual Basis of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Matters
of Bankruptcy: Fact and Fiction, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 491, 515 (1960). (Footnote omitted.)
However, "on the whole res judicata is a triumphal rule .. . ." 1B IMoore, Federal Practice
7T0A05[1I, at 629 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Mloore]. (Footnote omitted.) Res
judicata appears well established as a basis for the expansion of the summary jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court to trustee's counterclaims. See Katchen v. Landy, ,6 Sup. CL 467,
475 (1966); Conway v. Union Bank of Switzerland, supra note 63; Solar Mfg. Corp, 2O
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) ; In re Nathan, 93 F. Supp. 6E6
(S.D. Cal. 1951); Mloore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 63 Yale LJ.
1, 32-38 (195).
65. 204 F.2d at 607. Subsequent Second Circuit cases have been in accord with Conway.
E.g., Cherno v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 330 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1964); In the Matter of
De Gregorio, 219 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In the Matter of Farrell Publishing Corp.,
130 F. Supp. 449 (S.DN.Y. 1955).
66. 9S F. Supp. 6S6 (S.D. Cal. 1951), 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 142 (1952). For an intimate
discussion of this case and its ramifications, see Gendel, Jurisdiction of a Referee in Bank-
ruptcy To Render Affirmative Judgment on a Counterclaim in Favor of a Trustee, 26
So. Cal. L. Rev. 167 (1953).
67. The surrender to the trustee of any voidable preference received by the adverse
claimant is a condition precedent to the allowance of his claim. Bankruptcy Act § 57g, 52
Stat. 366 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1964). A problem has plagued the courts as to whether
the assertion of such a voidable preference in answer to a proof of claim constituted a
counterclaim. See Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 Ref. J. 73, 73
(1962). The Second Circuit, which had previously held, in Kleid v. Ruthhell Coal Co., 131
F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1942), that a 57g objection was not a counterclaim and could only be
used defensively, has overruled itself and found an analogy between such an objection
1966] COMM.3ENTS
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
permitted the claimant to withdraw its claim and was promptly reversed by the
district court which declined, however, to rely upon the Alexander decision for
two reasons: (1) the Alexander court had general equitable jurisdiction, whereas
a bankruptcy court is "purely statutory" and exercises only limited jurisdiction
based upon the consent of the parties;0 8 and (2) the counterclaim in Nathan was
a legal one to which the seventh amendment right to trial by jury attached,
whereas the four counterclaims in Alexander were equitable. 60 The Nathan court
preferred to base its decision on what it termed "the traditional common-law
technique of reasoning by analogy from recognized legal principles."7 0 Since,
by filing a proof of claim, the creditor himself alleges that there are no set offs or
counterclaims to his debt,71 he thereby impliedly consents to a determination of
the merits of any set off or counterclaim interposed.12 The doctrine of res judi-
cata would render any subsequent plenary suit by the trustee a mere formality.7"
The Nathan court therefore concluded that
the same considerations of reason and policy which support the holding that filing
of a claim gives consent of the creditor to adjudication of an affirmative judgment
on equitable counterclaims in a plenary suit ...also support the holding that filing
of a claim in bankruptcy gives the consent necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the
bankruptcy court to adjudicate counterclaims for preferences, both legal and equitable,
compulsory or permissive.74
This reference to permissive counterclaims seemed to indicate that, at least
where it is based upon a voidable preference, an unrelated counterclaim could be
summarily adjudicated. 5 However, the counterclaim in Nathan arose out of
the same transaction as the claim filed by the creditor. A subsequent decision in
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the circuit in which Nathan was
decided) eventually disspelled any conjecture as to jurisdiction over permissive
counterclaims in that circuit. Peters v. Lines0 concluded that the creditor's filing
of a proof of claim operates as consent to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by
the bankruptcy court over only those counterclaims which are compulsory in
nature. 77 Peters, however, did not involve a voidable preference.
seeking affirmative relief and a counterclaim. Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 Fad
163, 164 (2d Cir. 1962). However, the Supreme Court has muddied the waters by ignoring
this issue. See Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966).
68. 98 F. Supp. at 690.
69. Ibid. This distinction has been denied efficacy in the bankruptcy court by the Supreme
Court. See Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966).
70. 98 F. Supp. at 691.
71. Ibid.
72. Id. at 691-92.
73. Ibid; see note 64 supra.
74. 98 F. Supp. at 692. (Citation omitted.)
75. The Supreme Court recently concurred with this conclusion in Katchen v. Landy,
86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966).
76. 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960), 60 Mich. L. Rev. 96 (1961). It should be pointed out
that the Nathan decision, although decided within the Ninth Circuit, was not specifically
mentioned in Peters, but it was alluded to. 275 F.2d at 924.
77. Id. at 924-25.
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4. The Katclien Case and the Future of the Consensual Theory
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Katchcn v. Landy s the Tenth
Circuit had stood alone in its liberal view of the extent to which the filing of a
proof of claim conferred jurisdiction upon a bankruptcy court.70 In Inter-State
Nat'l Bank v. Luther,U the court upheld an affirmative judgment favoring the
trustee on a counterclaim based upon a preference unrelated to the transaction
out of which the claim arose. Dismissing the distinction between a compulsory
and a permissive counterclaim, the court pointed out that the
distinction is of no consequence here for concededly the counterclaim is within the
conferrable jurisdiction of the parties. And, being of the view that the [claimant]
Bank impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of the court, the counterclaim was
maintainable under Rule 13(b), F.R.C.P., whether compulsory or permissible91
The Tenth Circuit apparently was satisfied that consent implied from the mere
filing of a proof of claim was sufficient jurisdictional ground for the maintenance
of even a permissive counterclaim-at least until Katchcn.
Katchen involved four counterclaims for affirmative relief. Three sought re-
covery of voidable preferences, and the fourth demanded the purchase price of
subscribed stock. All four counterclaims arose out of transactions unrelated
to the transaction upon which the petitioner's claim was founded. As anticipated,
the bankruptcy court rendered judgment in favor of the trustee on all four
counterclaims. The circuit court62 reaffirmed its decision in Inter-State, but re-
fused "to extend the summary jurisdiction of the court by implied consent to
counterclaims which do not involve a preference, setoff, voidable lien, or a
fraudulent transfer, and which are wholly unrelated to the creditor's claim. -a
The trustee abandoned his counterclaim for the stock subscription, and the
creditor took the issue of the preferential counterclaims to the Supreme Court-
and lost.s
Unexpectedly, while affirming the Tenth Circuit, the Court avoided any explicit
reference to consent,-5 the mainstay of courts since Alexander, and chose instead
78. 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966), affirming 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964).
79. However, two other circuits had apparently left the question open. See Nortex
Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962); Continental Cas. Co. v. White,
269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959). The Nathan decision also expresed a liberal view on this
question. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
S0. 221 F.2d 332 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 310 (1955), cert. dismis:d pu
stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956), 69 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1955), 31 X.Y.U.L. Rev. 391 (1956).
S1. 221 F.2d at 390.
82. 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), 13 Kan. L. Rev. 427 (1965).
S3. 336 F.2d at 537.
S4. 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966).
S5. The Court appears to have deliberately avoided employing the consenual theory.
Rather than becoming bogged down in the haphazard development of the doctrine of im-
plied consent, the Court restricted itself to the immediate issue of 57g objections and derived
added support from that section's specific establishing of the surrender of a voidable
preference as a condition precedent to the alloiance of a claim.
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to base its opinion on the bankruptcy court's duty to allow and disallow claims80
where an objection has been interposed by the trustee.8 7 Mr. Justice White,
writing for the majority,8 8 viewed the dispositive test of the bankruptcy court's
proper exercise of summary jurisdiction as being whether "all of the substantial
factual and legal bases [of the trustee's claim] . . .have . . . been disposed of
in passing on objections to the claim."8 9 Emphasizing the need for expeditious
administration of bankrupt estates and congressional policy favoring this
goal,90 the Court concluded that "the objection under § 57(g) is, like other
objections, part and parcel of the allowance process and is subject to summary
adjudication by the bankruptcy court. This is the plain import of § 57 .... "91
Thus, the bankruptcy court is bound to resolve an objection based upon section
57g in summary proceedings, 92 and its determination would be res judicata in
a subsequent plenary suit by the trustee to recover such preference 3
Replying to the petitioner's contention that his seventh amendment right
to a trial by jury would be abridged by the bankruptcy court's exercise of
summary jurisdiction to order the surrender of a voidable preference which both
exceeds and is unrelated to his claim, the Court stated that "there is no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for determination of objections to claims .... ,,04
The basis for this conclusion was the equitable nature of the bankruptcy courtY0
The Court stressed the congressional intent that a trustee's statutory objections
be determined by summary proceedings,96 and pointed out the "practical effect"
of the bankruptcy court's necessary resolution of the preference issue.97
The Court, unfortunately, confined its decision to objections based upon
section 57g and refused to discuss objections founded upon any other claims
held by the trustee against the claimant.9 8 Nowhere in the opinion is the 57g
defense denominated as a counterclaim. Thus, the question of summary juris-
diction remains unresolved as to permissive counterclaims not involving a 57g
objection. However, the Court's test of the propriety of summary jurisdiction'0 0
86. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(2), 52 Stat. 842, (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(2) (1964).
87. See Bankruptcy Act § 57f, 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(f) (1964).
88. The decision was seven to two, with Justices Black and Douglas dissenting on the
basis of the dissent in the circuit court. See 336 F.2d at 540 (separate opinion).
89. 86 Sup. Ct. at 474 n.9.
90. Id. at 472, 473.
91. Id. at 473.
92. Ibid.
93. Id. at 475; see note 64 supra.
94. 86 Sup. Ct. at 476.
95. Ibid.; see note 13 supra.
96. 86 Sup. Ct. at 478.
97. Id. at 475.
98. In this way, the Court avoided the problems raised by the consensual theory. Sec
note 85 supra.
99. Section 57g objections have been viewed as counterclaims by courts in the past.
See, e.g., Nortex Trading Corp. v. 'Newfield, 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Nathan,
98 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
100. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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and its reference to objections in the generic sense of the term10 1 provide a basis
upon which to extend the Katczen reasoning to unrelated counterclaims founded
upon other than 57g objections. 102
I. RESOLUTIONS AND RECO=rNDATIONS
Unfortunately, the solution to this jurisdictional puzzle is not to be found in
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." ' 3 Even more lamentable is the fact that
Congress cannot be relied upon for a disposition of the problem.'" In the final
analysis, it is to the courts that the difficult task of resolving this morass will
fall. This will be accomplished only through a reasoned balancing of the argu-
ments for and against the extension of summary jurisdiction.
A. The Arguncnt for Expansion
1. Expeditious Administration
As one referee has aptly stated, "bankruptcy cases unlike General MacArthur's
old soldier never fade away. They must be closed."' - The importance of an
expeditious disposition of bankrupt estates, a highly persuasive argument in sup-
port of extension,'0 3 has long been recognized by the courts'0 7 and was one of the
purposes of the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.'" The necessity for
speed in bankruptcy administration becomes more compelling in light of the
ever-increasing number of bankruptcies. 09 Certainly, a narrow and restrictive
101. See 86 Sup. Ct. at 473, 476.
102. The Court did not exclude such an application of its reasoning, but avoided the
problem. It appears reasonable to view objections as inclusive of counterclaims other than
those based upon voidable preferences. If such be proper, the Katchen decision would support
an expansion to those counterclaims.
103. The very wording of several jurisdictional provisions in the Bankruptcy Act has
caused serious misconceptions as to this problem. See MlacLachlan § 197.
104. Congress possesses the power to extend summary jurisdiction to all bankruptcy
matters. Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 430 (1924). Congrecsional action
in this area has rightly been urged. See Gendel, supra note 66, at 173; Nadler, Summary
Jurisdiction To Render Affirmative Judgment on Counterclaims, Setoffs and Reclamations,
29 Ref. J. 39, 42 (1955). However, the present state of the law exemplifies the unwMllingness
of Congress to provide a solution, and it also appears unlikely that congrezsional action in
this area will be forthcoming. Thus far, any expansion of the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court has, of necessity, been effected through the courts. See Seidman, Summary
Jurisdiction of the Referee: Some Recent Developments, 39 Ref. J. NO (1965). It has
been suggested that congressional action must be awaited. See Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev.
256, 273 (1965); Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 571, 590-91 (1963). Such a view is naive and un-
realistic, as well as unnecessary.
105. Seidman, supra note 104, at 100.
106. See Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 Ref. J. 73 (1962).
107. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 346 (1S74); see Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d
919, 925 (9th Cir. 1960).
108. See H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
109. In the post war year of 194S, there were 13,510 banlauptcy cases filed. 1949 U.S.
Judicial Conf. Ann. Rep. 105. By 1964, this number had increased almost tenfold to
171,719. 1964 U.S. Judicial Conf. Ann. Rep. ISS.
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view of the extent to which summary jurisdiction may properly be exercised is
not conducive to efficiency and economy in bankruptcy administration," o which
has been described as "only second in importance to securing equality of
distribution."''
2. Avoidance of Multiplicity of Suits
Integral to any expeditious administration of bankrupt estates is the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation, an end to which both the courts112 and Congressla
have long aspired. The bankruptcy court's equitable jurisdiction, invoked by the
creditor, militates in favor of disposing of all rights of the parties with finality,'1 '
and eliminating the expense and delay occasioned by an otherwise requisite
plenary suit. No less consonant with the spirit and purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act is the judicially proclaimed doctrine of res judicata." 6 Although the opera-
tion of this doctrine would support the assumption of jurisdiction over any
counterclaim by the trustee,116 it is most persuasive where the counterclaim is
based upon a 57g objection.117
Complementing and implementing this judicial scheme has been the enactment
by Congress of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are made applicable
to bankruptcy proceedings by General Order 37.118 Positive support for expansion
of summary jurisdiction and the elimination of wasteful duplication in plenary
actions is found in Congress' dictate that the Federal Rules are to "be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""' 9
110. For examples of the basic factors which promote delay and greater expense in
plenary suits, see Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 22 Ref. J. 82, 86 (1948).
111. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 346 (1874).
112. "[Tlhe general policy of the law [is] against unnecessary multiplicity of suits."
O'Donnell v. Archie's Motor Express, 176 F. Supp. 36, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Accord, Chicago
& No. W. Ry. v. Lindell, 281 U.S. 14, 17 (1930); United States v. Frank, 207 F. Supp.
216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
113. It has been stated repeatedly that the intent of Congress in enacting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was to avoid multiplicity of suits. See, e.g., Blair v. Cleveland
Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1952); John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal Nat'l
Bank, 124 F.2d 995, 997 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp.
533, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
114. Commercial Discount Co. v. Rutledge, 297 F.2d 370, 373 (10th Cir. 1961); In re
Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1942) ; In re Gillespie Tire Co., 54 F. Supp. 336, 339-40
(W.D.S.C. 1942). See Nadler, Bankruptcy § 588a, at 456 (2d ed. 1965).
115. See note 64 supra.
116. See Seligson & King, 36 Ref. J. 73, 78 (1962). A good example of the use of the
collateral estoppel argument where the counterclaim was not based upon a 57g objection Is
Conway v. Union Bank of Switzerland, 204 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1953), petition for cert.
dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 978 (1956).
117. See Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966) ; Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 Yale L.J. 1, 32-38 (1958).
118. General Order 37, 11 U.S.C. App. (1964). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are thus made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings "in so far as they are not inconsistent
with the Act or with these general orders . . . ." Ibid.
119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. See note 112 supra.
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In implementing this policy, the treatment of counterclaims adopted in the
Federal Rules and executed by the courts has been crucial. While little doubt
remains that a counterclaim of a compulsory nature under rule 13(a)2 ° is
within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,12 ' a dilemma has been
created by rule 13(b), which requires separate jurisdictional grounds for per-
missive counterclaims.12- If the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in the
latter case is viewed in a proper context, this additional requirement should be
"of no consequence."' 123 The consent of the adverse claimant, manifested by his
voluntary entrance into the bankruptcy proceedings, could easily be construed to
confer the jurisdictional basis for maintenance of a counterclaim of the permis-
sive type and the granting of affirmative relief on it.'2  This argument is en-
hanced by rule 13(c), which provides that any counterclaim, compulsory or
permissive, may be used to seek affirmative relief as well as merely to diminish or
expunge the claim of the adverse party."
3. Protecting the Claimant
Were summary jurisdiction extended to include all counterclaims by trustees
where the requisite consent by the adverse claimant is present, the adverse claim-
ant would also be accorded the benefits of the court's equitable powers and of
the Federal Rules. Thus, to preclude possible prejudice to the adverse claimant in
any given situation,126 the bankruptcy court could exercise its discretion, (1) as
a court of equity, to remit the trustee to a plenary action, 2 7 or (2) to order a
120. A compulsory counterclaim is one that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See
generally 3 Mloore ff 13.12-.13. The Federal Rules also provide for permLive counterclaims
(i.e., those which do not arise out of the same transaction as that sued upon. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 13(b). See generally 3 Moore ff 13.1S.
121. E.g., Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 2cO
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953); Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v.
Steem Elec. Corp., 128 F.2d 33S (Sth Cir. 1942).
122. See 3 Moore r 13.19[1], at 53-55.
123. Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir), cert. grantcd, 350
U.S. 810 (1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
124. The purpose of the requirement is, as Judge Mloore has said, to prevent the enlarg-
ment of federal jurisdiction "by a rule designed to liberalize pleadings." 3 Moore , 13.19[l],
at 55. There is no doubt that summary jurisdiction may be conferred by con-snt. See cacs
cited note 12 supra. "[T]he counterclaim is within the conferrable jurisdiction of the parties."
Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, supra note 123, at 390. Although Katchen rcfmcd to extend
Inter-State to unrelated counterclaims not involving a 57g objection, see text accompanying
note 83 supra, nevertheless, the reasoning in Inter-State still appcars to be valid as to such
counterclaims. See 2 Coller 23.03, at 555; Seligson & King, supra note 1C2, at 73.
125. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(c). See generally 3 'Moore I 13.24.
126. This is one of the criteria applied for the ordering of a separate trial under Fed. R.
Cir. P. 42(b). Whether prejudice is present should depend on the circumstances of each
case; e.g., a gross disproportion between a trustee's counterclaim and the claim filed.
127. See Moore, supra note 117, at 33 & n.1S6.
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separate plenary trial of the counterclaim under rule 42 (b).128 The ensuing delay
could be minimized by conditioning the court's order upon consent to a plenary
action on the counterclaim in the district court under section 23b,' 2 D if neces-
sary, and to an immediate and pre-emptory setting of a date for trial.' 30
B. The Argument Against Summary Jurisdiction
1. The Seventh Amendment
It has been urged that "fundamental principles cannot be lightly set aside"''
merely to secure summary adjudication of trustee's counterclaims. Chief among
these "fundamental principles" offered as reasons for restricting, or constricting,
summary jurisdiction is the right to a trial by jury under the seventh amend-
ment. 3 2 Where the trustee's claim for affirmative relief is founded upon a 57g
objection, there is no longer any doubt that the seventh amendment right does
not attach to the adjudication of the objection.23  In a case in which the counter-
claim by the trustee is based upon an objection which does not involve a
voidable preference, the right to a jury trial should also be defeated by the
operation of the consensual theory. 34
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Under this rule, a separate trial "should not be ordered
unless such a disposition is dearly necessary .... [And it is] in the discretion of the trial
judge [referee]." 5 Moore ff 42.03, at 1211. (Footnote omitted.)
129. This is the use of § 23b in its most proper sense. See 2 Collier I 23.14.
130. This method of creditor-consent and fixing a pre-emptory trial date has been
suggested, but not as it is here proposed to be used. See Ferguson, The Consensual Basis of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Matters of Bankruptcy: Fact and Fiction, 14 Rutgers L.
Rev. 491, 517 (1960); Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 256, 272-73 (1965). If discretion
dictates such action, this method would be wisely chosen, inasmuch as "the potential for
delay is minimized by restricting the plenary proceeding to the federal court . . . ." Ferguson,
supra at 517.
131. Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 571, 590 (1963).
132. See Ferguson, supra note 130, at 512-13; Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 571, 584-85 (1963).
But see Note, 65 Yale L.J. 694, 706 & n.55 (1956).
Absent his consent to summary proceedings, an adverse claimant has a right to plenary
adjudication and to a jury trial as to a trustee's claim against him. See note 11 supra and
accompanying text. Professor Ferguson viewed the problem from a false perspective insofar
as he chose to deny absolutely the efficacy of the doctrine of res judicata and of the
consensual theory, rather than to balance the operation of these concepts against the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial.
133. Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467, 476-77 (1966).
134. Syllogistically, the argument defeating the right to a trial by jury through the
consensual theory may be stated as follows:
(a) Summary proceedings do not carry with them the right to a jury trial. See notes
6 & 8 supra and accompanying text. (b) An adverse claimant, by filing a proof of claim
or a reclamation petition, consents to summary proceedings in the bankruptcy court, even
where he would otherwise have a right to a plenary procedure. See 2 Collier 11 23.08(1],
at 533. (c) Therefore, an adverse claimant's consent operates, in effect, as a waiver of any
right to a plenary suit and to a jury trial of issues raised by the trustee's counterclaims.
The elements of this reasoning have strong support in decisional law. The right to a plenary
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If, as a last resort, the opponents of any expansion of the summary jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court have turned to the over-exalted jury trial, they were no
doubt encouraged by the decision of the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover.a35 Although it is an inescapable conclusion from Beacon that
the right to a jury trial in civil cases is to be preserved and that no impairment
of it will be countenanced by the Court, 36 it must be noted that (1) the appli-
cability of the seventh amendment to bankruptcy proceedings remains question-
able; 137 (2) the summary proceedings to which a filing adverse claimant thereby
consents do not encompass the right to a jury trial;1'3 and (3) the Bankruptcy
Act itself gives no new right of jury trial to the creditor, but only such rights
as exist or are subsequently extended to him. 30 Any attempt to apply the Beacon
decision to bankruptcy proceedings without taking cognizance of these points
and of the consensual aspects of summary jurisdiction is foolhardy.140
2. The Assault on the Referee
The referee in bankruptcy occupies a pivotal position in light of the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act mandating direct reference.1 1 It has even been suggested
that the administrative and jurisdictional problems arising in the bankruptcy
court could be solved by raising that court to the full status of the district court
suit is procedural and thus may be waived. O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 455 (10th
Cir. 1964); In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1945). There i3 also
authorit to support the view that the seventh amendment is inapplicable in bankruptcy
proceedings. Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467, 476-77 (19G6); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S.
126, 133-34 (ISsi); In re Trans-Pacific Corp., 76 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1947), afi'd per
curiam sub nom. Trans-Pacific Corp. v. Goggin, 166 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. S15 (1943); In re Christensen, 101 Fed. 243 (N.D. Iowa I1m). However, even if the
right to jury trial does attach, it can be waived. Jesonis v. Oliver J. Olson & Co, 233 F.2d
307, 303 (9th Cir. 1956); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (Sth Cir.), cet. denied, 3MS
U.S. 816 (1949).
In the final analysis, it may be stated that an adverse claimant, by his voluntary entry
into the bankruptcy court, "has voluntarily sought a forum where the procedure of equity
obtains.... By his election he must be held to have waived a jury." In re Standard Td. &
Elec. Co., 157 Fed. 106, 113 (E.D. Wis. 1907), aff'd sub nom. Knapp v. Miwau:ue Trust
Co., 162 Fed. 675 (7th Cir. 190S), aff'd, 216 U.S. 545 (1910).
135. 359 US. 500 (1959), 58 'Mich. L. Rev. 474 (1960), 35 X.Y.U.L. Rev. 2S9 (1960).
136. See 359 U.S. at 510-11 & n.1S. The Supreme Court rciterated this view in Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962), 15 Ala. L. Rev. 562 (1963).
137. See note 134 supra.
138. Ibid.
139. See Bankruptcy Act § 19, 52 Stat. 852 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1964). See generally
2 Collier l' 19.07.
140. The petitioner in Katchen sought to assert the Beacon and Dairy Queen decisions,
but the Supreme Court rejected the contention that these decisions precluded the summary
adjudication of a 57g objection. Katchen v. Landy, 86 Sup. Ct. 467, 477-73 (19C6).
141. Bankruptcy Act § 22a, 73 Stat. 109 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964). Formerly,
reference was within the discretion of the district judge. Bankruptcy Act § 22a, ch. 541, 20
Stat. 552 (1S98).
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so that the powers of the referee could be thereby expanded.142 While there is
no reason to believe that these suggestions will become law, there is no longer any
efficacy in the objection to the expansion of summary jurisdiction based upon the
allegation that referees are "collection-minded." The Bankruptcy Act itself now
provides for compensation of referees on a fixed-salary basis. 143 In addition to
the fact that the bankruptcy courts are capable of being, and have been, well
administered, 44 there is, for the unreasonably fearful creditor, the safeguard of
review by the district courts.145
IV. CONCLUSION
A trend is readily discernible in the courts to enlarge the summary jurisdiction
of the courts of bankruptcy. Basically, it comes down to a balancing of the
"absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A"' 40 against specious constitutional
and procedural arguments. The equitable nature of the court, the applicability of
the Federal Rules, and the desirability of expeditious and economical disposition
of bankrupt estates militate in favor of the extension of the consensual summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to all claims proffered by the trustee in
answer to an adverse claimant's voluntary147 filing of a proof of claim or re-
clamation petition. The referees have persistently asked for increased summary
jurisdiction and a clarification of the present jurisdictional powers of the bank-
ruptcy court in this area.' 48 Despite the obvious trend toward the needed ex-
pansion, however, there is still much vigorous dissent. 49
142. See Hanna & MacLachlan, Cases on Creditors' Rights 394-95 (5th cd. 1957);
Rochelle & King, A Proposal To Raise Bankruptcy Courts to District Court Level, 13 Kan.
L. Rev. 391 (1965).
143. Bankruptcy Act § 40, 60 Stat. 326 (1946), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 68 (1964). See
Hunt, Summary Proceedings in Bankruptcy, 22 Ref. J. 109, 113 (1948); Note, 65 Yale L.J.
694, 702 & n.38 (1956). Contra, Friebolin, Summary Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts,
23 Ref. J. 43 (1949).
144. See Rochelle & King, supra note 142, at 396; Address by Mr. Justice Harlan, National
Ass'n of Referees in Bankruptcy Annual Convention, Oct. 11, 1955, in 30 Ref. J. 3 (1956).
145. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2(10), 39c, 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 74 Stat. 528 (1960), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 11(a)(10), 67(c) (1964).
146. Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913).
147. All provable claims must be filed within the statutory period. Bankruptcy Act
§ 57n, 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1964). Thus, it is seen that filing a proof of
claim is necessary before a creditor may share in the bankrupt estate. Although it may be
urged that this injects an element of compulsion and renders the filing involuntary, such a
conclusion does not find support. See In re Standard Tel. & Elec. Co., 157 Fed. 106, 113
(E.D. Wis. 1907), aff'd sub nom. Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 162 Fed. 675 (7th Cir.
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6]COMMENTS
The uncertainty surrounding the problem of summary jurisdiction is, in large
measure, a result of its staggering complexity.10° Oversimplified distinctionsP 1
and poor statutory draftsmanshiplr2 have given rise to a monumental morass of
conflicting decisional law. Nonetheless, the courts have achieved a reasonably
,atisfactory solution by sustaining summary jurisdiction to award affirmative
relief to the trustee where the counterclaim is closely related to the claim and
where the trustee seeks to recover a voidable preference, whether it be related or
not. However, in furtherance of the efficient and speedy administration of
bankrupt estates (ergo, to the advantage of both claimants and bankrupt), the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over all of trustee's counterclaims
may, and should, be recognized with the exercise of discretion by the bankruptcy
court to avoid inequities.
aff'd, 86 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966) ; Ferguson, supra note 130, at 517; Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev.
256 (1965). Little has been said of the possibility of claimants' becoming excessively reticent
in pursuing their claims if summary jurisdiction were expanded, but this is an important
factor to be considered. See MacLachlan § 196, at 211-12. Nevertheless, it would appear
to be desirable that irresponsible claim policies among creditors be discouraged, and, if
this be one of the results of an expanded summary jurisdiction, it is a persuasive supporting
argument. With the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court expanding, many claimants
will undoubtedly seek to preclude the exercise of such jurisdiction over the trustee's p,rmis-
sive counterclaims or unrelated objections by objecting to summary proceedings in their
proof of claim-i.e., by reserving the right to a plenary adjudication of any counterclims
interposed by the trustee in his objection. This would appear to be a failing cause. The
claim of a creditor who is faced with a 57g objection cannot, under any circumstances, be
allowed without the summary adjudication of the voidable preference, whether it be related
or unrelated. See Katchen v. Landy, S6 Sup. Ct. 467, 473 (19G6). '"here the counterclaim
does not involve a 57g objection, the propriety and effect of such a reservation is at least in
the realm of possibility. Several decisions have given effect to such a reservation. See In re
Eakin, 154 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1946); In the Matter of Industrial A'sociates, Inc., 155 F. Supp.
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However, these decisions erringly relied either upon distinguishable authority, such as Cline v.
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cause), or upon pre-Alexander cases, such as In re Bacon, 210 Fed. 129 (2d Cir. 1913).
In addition to the erroneous basis for this past approval of such "reservation clauses," it is
doubtful, in light of Katchen and Alexander, that such a reservation will be permitted since
it runs counter to the paramountcy of the judicially and congressionally declared policy of
expeditious administration. See Katchen v. Landy, S6 Sup. Ct. 467 (1966).
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